Don’t Let the Hawks Fool You: Diplomacy Can Help the Iranian People

Amid the threat of regional war, diplomacy is more needed than ever

Many people may wonder why anyone would be against diplomacy with Iran, a long-standing adversary of the United States. Isn’t diplomacy the preferred way of resolving conflicts peacefully, rather than resorting to violence? Wouldn’t anyone who values peace and human dignity choose dialogue over war?

The reality is of course not that simple. US-Iran relations are fraught with complexities and challenges, and there are powerful forces on both sides that have a vested interest in maintaining hostility and mistrust. In the United States, some of the most vocal opponents of diplomacy with Iran are neoconservatives and right-wing pro-Israel groups, who see the Islamic Republic as an existential threat to their vision of a Middle East dominated by a US-backed Israel. In Iran, some of the most rigid hardliners regard the United States as an irreconcilable enemy of their ideological vision that requires perpetual resistance. These factions have invested enormous resources and influence to demonize and sabotage any diplomatic efforts to ease tensions and build cooperation.

But there is also a third group that has emerged as a vocal critic of US-Iran diplomacy: those who claim to be champions of human rights, both in the US and Europe, and who argue that engaging with the Islamic Republic is morally wrong. This group includes many members of the Iranian diaspora, who have suffered from the repression and brutality of the Iranian government and who demand justice and accountability for its crimes. They contend that any diplomatic engagement with Iran would amount to legitimizing and empowering an authoritarian state that violates the rights and dignity of its own people.

This is the group that I want to address in this post, because I believe that their position is based on a false dilemma and a flawed understanding of the dynamics of US-Iran relations and the prospects for human rights and democracy in Iran.

I speak from a position of both professional expertise and personal experience. I am a foreign policy analyst who has worked for a decade on US-Iran issues and who has advocated for diplomatic engagement based on rigorous research, pragmatic realism, and a genuine concern for the welfare of ordinary people on both sides. I am also a person of Iranian heritage, and an American who grew up in Illinois and attended public schools and universities in the US, who cares deeply about the wellbeing of the Iranian people and who has no sympathy or affinity for the theocratic, autocratic, and oppressive regime that rules over them. I have also been involved in human rights activism, and I support efforts that I think can advance the cause of peaceful democratic change in Iran. I am therefore offended and troubled by the accusation that is often hurled at supporters of US-Iran diplomacy, especially those of Iranian origin (in a way that smacks of racism), that we are somehow apologists or enablers of Iran’s theocracy and its repression of the Iranian people.

This accusation may seem absurd to many who are not familiar with the intricacies of the Iran policy debate in Washington. Isn’t it obvious that peace is made with enemies, not friends? Isn’t it better to talk than fight?

Yet, many claim that any dialogue or negotiation with Iran, whether on the nuclear issue or other matters, would only give the Iranian government more legitimacy and power to continue its repression and abuses.

I disagree with this view. I believe that diplomacy with Iran is the most preferable and ideal policy for the US to pursue, rather than the alternatives favored by the anti-diplomacy camp in Washington.

These alternatives are essentially what the US has tried for most of the time since the 1979 revolution in Iran, but especially under the Trump administration: policies of sanctions, isolation, and constant escalation that risk sparking a devastating war.

These policies, which started after the 1979 US embassy takeover, have failed to achieve any of the US objectives in Iran, whether changing the government, curbing its regional influence, or improving its human rights record. On the contrary, they have only strengthened the hardliners and weakened the moderates and reformists in Iran, who have sought more engagement and cooperation with the outside world.

The only significant departure from this pattern occurred in Obama’s second term, when the US and Iran reached a historic diplomatic agreement on the nuclear issue, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran nuclear deal. This deal, which was implemented in January 2016, offered a glimpse of a new US strategy towards Iran, one that was still adversarial but based on mutual compromise and high-level communication (as exemplified by the frequent contacts between then US secretary of state John Kerry and Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif, the first of their kind since before the 1979 revolution). This strategy had the potential to open the door for further dialogue and cooperation on other issues of mutual concern, such as regional stability, counterterrorism, and human rights.

However, this potential was never realized, and Trump was elected the same year the deal went into effect on a campaign promise to tear it up. He would do so in May 2018 be reimposing harsh sanctions on Iran, in violation of the deal and against the advice of US allies and partners. Trump’s decision was influenced by his hawkish pro-Israel donors, such as Sheldon Adelson, who was Trump’s biggest donor in 2016 and who had previously called for dropping a nuclear bomb on Iran.

So what had the 2015 nuclear deal accomplished? It imposed unprecedented restrictions and inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, effectively blocking its possible pathways to a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years, with many limitations lasting longer. And it lifted UN and some US sanctions on Iran, giving it some relief from the economic pressure and isolation it had faced for years.

What effect did this have on Iranians? Contrary to the claims of those who say that sanctions relief only benefits the ruling elite and not the ordinary people, the data shows that the sanctions relief under the deal improved many economic indicators that had suffered under Obama’s first term sanctions, such as inflation, poverty, and real income. However, these indicators worsened again after Trump reimposed sanctions in 2018, causing severe harm to the living standards of Iranian citizens, showing a direct correlation between the imposition and removal of sanctions and the wellbeing of Iranian citizens.

Real household spending and real Gross National Income in Iran between 2011-2020

Sanctions have also disproportionately hurt the most vulnerable segments of the Iranian population, such as women and rural dwellers. The poverty rate at the national level rose from 22.47% in 2010 to 38.19% in 2020, and it was even higher for rural Iranians at 47.7% in 2020. Iranian women suffered more from job losses due to sanctions, while they benefited more from job creation after the deal. Since the US sanctions were reinstated in 2018, two out of every three jobs lost belonged to women. In contrast, one out of every two jobs created after the deal went to women.

Another economic measure impacted by sanctions is the “misery index,” which is a semi-informal indicator of the general public’s ability to purchase basic goods. This indicator shows a sizable increase in “national misery” for the periods that Iran has been under country-level sanctions. The rate stood at 61.12% in 2013, dropped to 27.21% in 2016 after the nuclear agreement was reached, and sharply rebounded to 76% in 2019 amid the Trump administration’s renewed sanctions push.

Source:  Iran Statistical Center

Those who advocate for sanctions and oppose diplomacy with Iran have little evidence to support their claims that their policies are beneficial for the Iranian people or for the US national security interests. Yet they assert them with moral righteousness and disregard the facts.

The facts, as supported by academic research, also show that sanctions undermine the prospects for democratic change in authoritarian regimes. They erode civil society and the pro-democracy movements that challenge the status quo. They increase the repression and violence of the governments that face external pressure. They impoverish the ordinary people and enrich the ruling elite. There are many examples of this phenomenon, from Cuba to Venezuela to North Korea.

Iran is no exception. The main winners of the US policies of sanctions and isolation and threats since 1979 have been the most hardline and fundamentalist factions in the Islamic Republic, who have used the US as an enemy to justify their militarization and consolidation of power. They have been delighted by Trump’s so-called maximum pressure campaign, which gave them the opportunity to marginalize the moderates and reformists who sought more engagement and openness with the world. Since 2018, the Iranian hardliners, loyal to the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard, have tightened their grip on all aspects of the political, economic, and security spheres in Iran, and have accelerated their nuclear program to the point where they are only weeks away from having enough fissile material for a bomb, if they choose to pursue that path.

The fact is that the most repressive forces in Iran have a lot to thank Trump for, and sadly, some members of the diaspora who mistakenly support the failed US approach towards Iran.