Trump’s Iran Policy

Sanctions, Diplomacy & What Comes Next

The past week has brought renewed tension—and cautious openings—between the United States and Iran. As Trump ramps up pressure, powerful voices in Washington are trying to push him toward war, selling it as an easy win over a supposedly weakened adversary. But this is a dangerous illusion.

In my latest articles, I lay out two starkly different paths Trump could take.

• In The American Conservative, I argue that Trump has a unique opportunity to break the cycle with a legacy-defining deal that makes America safer and avoids a disastrous war.

• In the International Policy Journal, I expose the way Washington’s hawks are steering him toward confrontation, framing escalation as both inevitable and desirable. If Trump follows their lead, he risks entangling the U.S. in yet another costly and unwinnable conflict.

Meanwhile, this past week has been eventful in U.S.-Iran relations. President Trump signed a presidential memorandum—notably not an executive order—just before meeting Netanyahu at the White House. This directive instructed U.S. agencies to prepare for new sanctions on Iran, marking a kind of return to Trump's "maximum pressure" strategy (which in reality never stopped under Biden).

But Trump’s remarks during the signing were just as revealing as the document itself. He repeatedly emphasized that he hopes these measures "will hardly have to be used at all." He made it clear that his primary goal is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and signaled openness to meeting with his Iranian counterpart. This is a crucial point: Trump is keeping the door to diplomacy open, not slamming it shut.

Signs from Tehran: More Than Just Pezeshkian

While much focus regarding Iran is on the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, recent statements from Ali Akbar Ahmadian, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, may be even more significant. A former IRGC commander, Ahmadian leads a body that includes figures from across Iran’s political and military spectrum.

His latest remarks suggest a strategic opening for negotiations. He invoked Quranic and religious justifications for diplomacy, rejecting the notion that dialogue and steadfastness are mutually exclusive:

“Some people place dialogue and negotiation in opposition to steadfastness. This is a mistaken perception. Negotiation can even be conducted with disbelievers.”

Ahmadian also laid out a religious and strategic rationale for negotiations, arguing that Iran’s leadership must distinguish between when to compromise and when to stand firm:

"The lives of our Imams are full of examples of when to compromise and when not to. If we are stubborn in situations where we should compromise, we will suffer harm. Likewise, in situations where we should stand firm, if we compromise, it is a mistake."

His remarks weren’t just theoretical. In defending Iran’s decision not to escalate against Israel in a "True Promise 3" operation, Ahmadian rejected the notion that Iran and Israel are at war, cautioning against framing their conflict in such terms:

"There is a great effort to erase the issue of resistance and claim that there has been a war between Iran and Israel for forty years.

War and resistance are different.

First, our confrontation with the Zionist regime has not been a war; even now, we do not have a war in that sense.

They took an action, and we took an action in response. This is not the concept of war. Anyone who understands war knows that this is not war."

This is a significant development. Ahmadian’s remarks suggest that Iran’s openness to diplomacy is not just limited to Pezeshkian's administration but extends to the military and IRGC leadership. With that said, he also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to "resistance," making it clear that while war could happen, it is not Iran’s goal.

What Would a Trump-Iran Negotiation Look Like?

Despite the return of maximum pressure, the broader behavior of the Trump administration does not suggest that negotiations are impossible. If talks happen, they will almost certainly begin with the nuclear issue—though regional matters and Iran’s missile program could also come up.

On regional issues, the relative de-escalation—ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, the halt in attacks in Iraq and Yemen—actually creates conditions that favor diplomacy. While regional concerns may be raised, they are unlikely to derail a nuclear deal.

On missiles, Iran will likely insist on not extending their range while refusing to negotiate on the program itself.

But the real question is Trump’s demands.

Will he settle for something like the 2015 Obama-era nuclear—or will he push for more?

Ultimately, he wants a "new" deal distinct from Obama's, one that he can market as a political victory over both Obama and Biden.

Deal or No Deal?

At this stage, I believe that the probability of a deal is higher than the probability of no deal.

If no deal is reached, the key question will be: To what level will tensions escalate?